The shortcomings of the scientific method [metaphysics]

[Zyxzevn]

Hi, I have posted this on another website, but I think you will like it.
I wrote it i bit funny to make it easier to read.

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The shortcomings of the scientific method

Science is based upon the scientific method:
1 - build theory around observation.
2 - make a testable mathematical model
3 - experiment to test model
It gives great practical advancements.

Additionally: science does not really like models that are not similar to already existing models. One can look at the Egyptian pyramids or at the Electrical universe[1] to see that there are interesting alternative models and theories, but simply rejected because they are not mainstream and have some implications.
Science really does not like it when other fields of science are affected. See for example /r/QuantumBiology[2]

My experience is that new models are are only accepted when they strengthen already accepted ideas and explanations in other fields of science. Some scientists see that even as part of the scientific method. Why that is, is a totally different story.

But lets go back to the scientific principle.
It logically does not work for 3 things:
1- "things" that can not be observed easily and
"things" that have no clear theory of what it is.
("wtf was that?")
2- "things" that do not follow a testable mathematical model.
("nice theory, but how can we test that?")
3- "things" that can not be repeated.
("Nope..")

There are many "things" that fall under one of these categories:
1 - love/ chi/prana / UFOs
2 - dreams/ conscious / auras /ghosts
3 - afterlife

It does not mean that these things do not exist, but we can not understand them with the scientific method. So any research on it is by definition invalid science.

From the scientific method we go the other side around. We try to find models (based upon accepted models) that match with some of the effects we get from these "things". That way we get "explanations" for everything, but they do not completely match up. Then we have "explanations" why they don't match up, like "false memories", "chance", "hoaxers" etcetera. These do not follow the scientific method, but they do match with the other already accepted theories.

That is very frustrating for people that do see that these explanations are (usually) wrong. And the effect is that we end up understanding less of the phenomena involved.

And that is what this subreddit is about!
Things that are true, but not yet understood

So let's look at the scientific method again:

|----------------------------------------
|---------[$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$]-----
|---------[$$$$$ scientific $$$$$$$$]------
|---------[$$$$$- method $$$$$$$$]-----
|---------[$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$]-----
|---------[$$$$$$$$ physical $$$$$$$]-----
|---------[$$$$$$$$ world $$$$$$$$$]-----
|---------[$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$]-----
|----------------------------------------

There it is. It is in a box. The physical world is fully contained within the scientific method box.
The $ signs could represent how much scientists like the scientific method or what the physical world is about. But it was actually the reddit editor that made it difficult to make a box like structure.

What is wrong? (besides the money).
There may be something outside the box..

|----------------------------------------
| ---------[$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$]-----
|---------[$$$$$ scientific $$$$$$$$]------
|---------[$$$$$- method $$$$$$$$]-----
|---------[$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$]-----
|---------[$$$$$$$$ physical $$$$$$$]-----
|---------[$$$$$$$$ world $$$$$$$$$]-----
|---------[$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$]-----
| ----------------------------------------
|----------------------------------------
|---------------- non ----------------------
|----------------- physical --------------------
|------------------ world ----------------------
| ----------------------------------------
| ----------------------------------------

Oops..
Did we miss something with our scientific method?
That is impossible you would think?
What would be the consequences if this was true?

-> Most scientists would say:
"that means that our formula's are wrong?
Impossible!"

Let us look at the box again? Does something change to the formulas?
-Nope!

Then what is with the formula's?
- Let us look at maths for that:
x*x= -1
As you know this is wrong math.
But there is a definition to math that adds a *imaginary number called i. With the help of "imaginary" numbers we can still use our old formulas and apply them in situations that gave problems using "real" numbers. The combination of i and the "real" numbers are called "complex" numbers. The physical formulas are filled with "complex" numbers!

It is a very smart mathematical trick. We have the old numbers and formulas but add something that is "imaginary", so that we can compute and understand things that were outside the range of the "real" numbers before. The "complex" numbers are an extension to "real" numbers. Meaning that all real numbers can be found within the complex numbers. And using formulas in physics with complex numbers we get "real" numbers again.

With quantum physics the same principle has been applied to the original physical formula system:
A lot of physical behavior can be described as a product of quantum-physical behavior.

The same trick can be applied to this box-model of the physical world.
Everything within the box can stay the same if the physical world is a product or result from the non-physical world.

And that is exactly what I think: the physical energy and behavior is a after
product of chi and can be influenced by chi. Chi is again produced by conscious.
How exactly?
Well it seems that chi produces something that i call "frozen chi", which behaves like a physical substance and after time it forms photons and particles from which the physical world is formed.
But we are forming a theory again!
It may give more insight, but did I not just prove that the scientific method does not work!

Conclusions
By using logic, it is clear that the non-physical world may be real, but can never be described with the scientific method.

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Original posting on reddit..
http://www.reddit.com/r/paradigmchange/ ... ic_method/

[Sparky]

By using logic, it is clear that the non-physical world may be real, but can never be described with the scientific method.

Depends on who's scientific method.

[Zyxzevn]

I was inspired to add a bit more..

Something unknown (=outside and conflicting with models) can not be understood from things that are already known (the models). The main scientific community uses the scientific method to do exactly that.

To understand them one needs to introduce something new (a new model) that does not even need to comply with the old ideas.

In Electrical Universe the idea of plasma physics governing many cosmic events may be true, but it does falsify some of the established theories (the models). The scientific method does not allow to obsolete the old models, but instead encourages to "resurrect" these models adding "magic" theories to keep them alive.
The only case in which old theories are dropped is when they can not find "magic" explanations, and not deny the evidence involved. Which can take a long time.

In the research that I do in Chi, this is much worse. Chi is usually regarded as a disillusion or whatever psychological name is thought of.
Following the scientific method:
1) there are many observations, but the theory breaks most established ideas.
The theory is not complete, while the scientific community can simply declare
completeness by denying the observations made.
2) the testable model is harder because the model is not really mathematical.
For instance the intensity of chi-emissions do not change with distance.
Chi emissions depend on the persons involved.
3) results from experiments
Observations can not be made by everyone, some people are simply too blind for chi.
-> call that a double blind test
Some people can block chi, while they don't know it.
-> "we could not duplicate your observations"
Observations by machines usually do not show impressive results,
but if they do it is by a talented chi-master.
(someone who is very good in controlling and emitting chi)
-> "we found a hoaxer"

I find the fundamentals of science very restrictive. While they have been helping us with practical results very well we should not forget that any restriction does automatically restrict the truth.
That is why I symbolize science with a box. It describes everything within that box, but can never see what is going on outside it. If something would interfere with the box from the outside, science can think of millions of theories what might be going on, but uses it to deny the existence of anything outside it.
For example: quantum-mechanics does describe the existence of a wave-function that is independent of time and place (except that of the dynamic environment). But it does not explain why such a function would exist. The string-theory tries it by adding stuff inside the space-time-energy concept. But any theory of "something" outside space-time-energy that would influence such a wave function is considered invalid. And the physical theory on chi that I got now does exactly that.
(Its actually a lot simpler than string theory. And probably any theory is

[Plasmatic]

Sparky said:

Depends on who's scientific method.

Indeed!

One of the central debates in the philosophy of science is that of scientific realism. Central to this debate is the question of how to use language to talk meaningfully in "observation language" about hypothetical unobservables.(theoretical concepts/abstract entities) This falls under epistemology in general and the philosophy of language in particular. The related question is how do we validly relate epistemic norms to drawing conclusions about metaphysics (zyxzevn's "box").

With this understanding of the philosophical context we can reduce zyxzevn's post to the fundamental premise his argument presupposes (whether he/she is aware of this or not).

Something unknown (=outside and conflicting with models) can not be understood from things that are already known (the models). The main scientific community uses the scientific method to do exactly that.

To understand them one needs to introduce something new (a new model) that does not even need to comply with the old ideas.

This is an explicit statement that presupposes very important things about ones view of concepts. The rejection of meaning invariance by the likes of Fayerabend and his anti-positivist ilk is echoed in this claim. The above quote wants to constrain the question to "models", but the premise presupposes a more fundamental position on concepts.

When I talk of the abstract entity "MIGHTY MOUSE", one is able to comprehend the abstract qualities of this hypothetical entity because all the attributes of mighty mouse are abstracted from perceptually experienced (observable) entities. The facial features of MM were abstracted from the observation of actual mice. The bipedal upright method of walking was abstracted from the perceptual experience of humans, etc. But, if I propose an abstract entity such as a "square-circle" one can easily see this as a failed integration of/misuse of language. What has been abandoned by philosophers is explaining what this implies about concept formation.

So when I ask those who have absorbed the philosophical premises implicit in their culture without explicit knowledge of its contextual roots questions like:

"How do I form the concept of "chI", "energy", "extended mind", "hologram" etc."

they will not be able to answer.

Why? Because the philosophers abandoned this question long before others assumed the premises that are a consequence of ignorance of this subject!

Reason has three roots, perception, conception and logic. The use of language involves all three.

[bdw000]

A great quote from I do not remember where:

"Science knows much, but ignores . . . . .
PRACTICALLY EVERYTHING."

[ZenMonkeyNZ]

In the philosophy of science the limitations of science are well understood. It is simply that most scientists and laypeople never learn what these are or else fail to take them seriously. Science is a philosophical framework. We just need to make sure we use our mental tools correctly.

[Plasmatic]

Zenmonkey said:

In the philosophy of science the limitations of science are well understood. It is simply that most scientists and laypeople never learn what these are or else fail to take them seriously. Science is a philosophical framework. We just need to make sure we use our mental tools correctly.

The philosophy of science is a species of study under which any number of philosophical views of science fall. There is no generic "philosophy of science view" of scientific method and anyone who talks this way has obviously not done much homework into the subject. Basically this method of referring assumes some undefined standard as an out of context absolute.

[bdw000]

Zenmonkey said:

In the philosophy of science the limitations of science are well understood. It is simply that most scientists and laypeople never learn what these are or else fail to take them seriously. Science is a philosophical framework. We just need to make sure we use our mental tools correctly.

The philosophy of science is a species of study under which any number of philosophical views of science fall. There is no generic "philosophy of science view" of scientific method and anyone who talks this way has obviously not done much homework into the subject. Basically this method of referring assumes some undefined standard as an out of context absolute.

I don't know Plasmatic: it seems to me that summarizing "the philosophy of science" as that "the limitations of science are well understood" is about as accurate as you can get in a nutshell sort of way.

I don't see Zenmonkey as saying "there is one generic 'philosophy of science view'" of scientific method." The take-home message of the philosophy of science (well, for me anyway) could easily be stated as: "there are real PROBLEMS with scientific method," whichever subset of the philosophy of science you happen to prefer. And I think it is fair to say that most "scientists" "never learn what these are or else fail to take them seriously."

Isn't it fair to say that problems seem to crop up no matter what angle you look at science from??

[Plasmatic]

Hey bdw, you said:

I don't know Plasmatic: it seems to me that summarizing "the philosophy of science" as that "the limitations of science are well understood" is about as accurate as you can get in a nutshell sort of way[...]I don't see Zenmonkey as saying "there is one generic 'philosophy of science view'" of scientific method." The take-home message of the philosophy of science (well, for me anyway) could easily be stated as: "there are real PROBLEMS with scientific method," whichever subset of the philosophy of science you happen to prefer. And I think it is fair to say that most "scientists" "never learn what these are or else fail to take them seriously."

Notice you thought it necessary to say "for me anyway". Your statement is a consequence of your survey of certain kinds of method claimed of various philosophies of science you have encountered. I have no difficulty believing that in todays philosophic state of corruption and unreason that you have only encountered methods with serious "problems".

The error here is concluding that a universal context is limited to the particulars you have encountered. The science of method is an open ended class of study. That is, what ever particulars fall within the range of "science" are included regardless of if one has encountered it. By definition a philosophy that says the scientific method is a systematic application of reason to discovery and the collection of knowledge, where "reason" is held to be an unlimited method is still classified as a philosophy of science. Even if there is only one person who believes it.

Bdw said:

Isn't it fair to say that problems seem to crop up no matter what angle you look at science from??

Depends on what you mean by "problems". Given the limited statements you and zen have made it sounds like you may be referring to certain skeptical premises about knowledge that are popular but it is too early to tell. If you could give three examples I can better conclude what category of "problem" you are referring to. In my view most of the "problems" are with the methods folks claim are the standard science OUGHT to be using. That is the most popular interpretations are abysmal and deficient.

[ZenMonkeyNZ]

Depends on what you mean by "problems". Given the limited statements you and zen have made it sounds like you may be referring to certain skeptical premises about knowledge that are popular but it is too early to tell. If you could give three examples I can better conclude what category of "problem" you are referring to. In my view most of the "problems" are with the methods folks claim are the standard science OUGHT to be using. That is the most popular interpretations are abysmal and deficient.

The limited statements we have made might suggest we are posting short messages in an internet forum and not laying out a full treatise deconstructing our ideas. Note that you are also making very limited statements. That is the nature of this type of discussion. If you are interested in more clarification, then ask specific questions.

The philosophy of science is a species of study under which any number of philosophical views of science fall. There is no generic "philosophy of science view" of scientific method and anyone who talks this way has obviously not done much homework into the subject. Basically this method of referring assumes some undefined standard as an out of context absolute.

The implication being that you have done your homework. Which means you know there is a standard basis for all philosophy of science. It is this question: what separates science from other kinds of metaphysics? It is the demarcation problem. Sure, there are varying views as to what justifiably contributes to this demarcation. When I say something along the lines of "in the philosophy of science" I refer to well regarded notions put forth by people like Popper, but of course everyone will have different ideas about the validity or scope of such work. If you want to raise exception to these notions, then put forth your arguments.

[Plasmatic]

Zen said:

The limited statements we have made might suggest we are posting short messages in an internet forum and not laying out a full treatise deconstructing our ideas. Note that you are also making very limited statements. That is the nature of this type of discussion. If you are interested in more clarification, then ask specific questions.

You are dropping context Zen. The statement of mine on limitations was "limited" to the context of the type of "problems" or "limitations" you and bdw consider "well understood". All existents are limited ultimately, that is why context is important.

Zen said:

The implication being that you have done your homework.

Indeed, thats implied in any statement where the necessary sincerity conditions of the statement are satisfied....

Zen said:

Which means you know there is a standard basis for all philosophy of science. It is this question: what separates science from other kinds of metaphysics? It is the demarcation problem. Sure, there are varying views as to what justifiably contributes to this demarcation. When I say something along the lines of "in the philosophy of science" I refer to well regarded notions put forth by people like Popper, but of course everyone will have different ideas about the validity or scope of such work. If you want to raise exception to these notions, then put forth your arguments.

You see, you are importing a specific view of what the actual meta question of science is and taking it as a universal "well regarded" consensus as to what constitutes science. If one rather regards the primary question of POS as "What is Science?" One will not speak the way you have. You already presume that science is a type of metaphysics and your initial general statement I replied to contextually revealed that you held that your own view of science was a consensus one.

My statement stands as initially presented when contextually identified as a reductio of the notion that your own chosen epistemology is the standard of the entire study of what "science" qua science is... I don't need to argue over Popper's nonsense to add anything to it.

My argument is, your mistaking what you regard as the consensus view of science for what constitutes the general question that logically precedes it.

[ZenMonkeyNZ]

You are in danger of creating straw-man type arguments. Take your first sentence:

You see, you are importing a specific view of what the actual meta question of science is and taking it as a universal "well regarded" consensus as to what constitutes science.

I have made no comment as to what constitutes science. That answer is what you search for when you explore the question "What differentiates science from other forms of metaphysics?" That is the meta question. If you debate science as a form of metaphysics you are making up arbitrary definition(s). See below.

If one rather regards the primary question of POS as "What is Science?" One will not speak the way you have. You already presume that science is a type of metaphysics . . .

Yes, I do propose science is a kind of metaphysics.

In order to communicate well, words need to have commonly understood meaning. Speaking broadly, metaphysics is concerned with exploring the nature of reality. If you do not think science is a kind of metaphysics you are making up your own notion of the term(s) "metaphysics" and/or "science". Given standard definitions, you may reject aspects of metaphysics in science (since metaphysics encompasses many branches of philosophy) – but that doesn't change the fact that science is a kind of metaphysics. You are free to propose your own definitions, of course, but you need to be quite explicit about doing so, otherwise you cannot communicate clearly with others.

Unless you propose your own definition(s) I regard your question "What is science?" as essentially the same as saying "What differentiates science from other forms of metaphysics?".

. . . your initial general statement I replied to contextually revealed that you held that your own view of science was a consensus one.

What consensus? That science is a form of metaphysics? See above. Other than that, no, I do not hold that there is a consensus. However, I am happy to argue my position in a dialectic fashion.

My statement stands as initially presented when contextually identified as a reductio of the notion that your own chosen epistemology is the standard of the entire study of what "science" qua science is... I don't need to argue over Popper's nonsense to add anything to it.

Popper's nonsense? Disregarding, flippant remarks are not dialectic. Leave them out.

I do not hold my own epistemic views as the be-all and end-all, but as I said above, I am happy to argue them in a dialectic fashion. So far you only know that I regard science as a form of metaphysics, and that my meta question is "What differentiates science from other forms of metaphysics?", and that I generally hold with Popperian type views. Have you actually read his original material?

My argument is, your [sic] mistaking what you regard as the consensus view of science for what constitutes the general question that logically precedes it.

If by "the general question that logically precedes it" you mean "What is science?" your last sentence doesn't make sense given we are asking essentially the same meta question.

Why don't you tell us how you begin answering your question "What is science?"

[Plasmatic]

Zen said:

You are in danger of creating straw-man type arguments. Take your first sentence:

Plasmatic wrote:
You see, you are importing a specific view of what the actual meta question of science is and taking it as a universal "well regarded" consensus as to what constitutes science.

I have made no comment as to what constitutes science. That answer is what you search for when you explore the question "What differentiates science from other forms of metaphysics?" That is the meta question. If you debate science as a form of metaphysics you are making up arbitrary definition(s). See below.

Straw man aye?
Lets see.... You began by claiming that:

In the philosophy of science the limitations of science are well understood. It is simply that most scientists and laypeople never learn what these are or else fail to take them seriously. Science is a philosophical framework.

This is a clear statement unambiguously claiming that:

1). What science IS is "clear enough" in "the philosophy of science" for the "limitations of science" to be "understood".

2). And that what science IS is a "philosophical framework"

You have since added :

3)."there is a standard basis for all philosophy of science. It is this question: what separates science from other kinds of metaphysics? "

4)."When I say something along the lines of "in the philosophy of science" I refer to well regarded notions put forth by people like Popper

5)."Yes, I do propose science is a kind of metaphysics."


Every one of these statements are categorizing science into a specific genus and declaring that such categorization is "standard" and "well regarded" by yourself and those whom you see as falling within your own evaluation/categorization of "the philosophy of science".

Whats more is, you even claim a consensus or "standard definition" for metaphysics and science and that the existence of such a standard makes my own particular answers to what science and metaphysics are "arbitrary" given that standard.

Everyone of these are clearly instances of claiming that "There is [a] generic "philosophy of science view" of scientific method" and "assumes some undefined standard as an out of context absolute."

Now, you claimed:

Unless you propose your own definition(s) I regard your question "What is science?" as essentially the same as saying "What differentiates science from other forms of metaphysics?".

On the basis of your presumption that your categorization/definition of science is "standard" in the philosophy of science and you claim that there is onus on me to define-differentiate my own answer to "what is science".

The very request for my own definition concedes my point! What ever answer I give, whatever genus I argue science is a species of, will by definition be an instance of a different philosophy of science from your own! What's more is, "what is science?" means "What defines science?", which means "what genus and differentia does science fall into?". That makes your answer to the question "what is science?" classifying it as a species of the genus philosophy-metaphysics, by definition, not the question but an aswer to it!

Furthermore your claim that your own view-answer of "what science is" is the standard "well understood" definition is nonsense anyway. Both "science" and "metaphysics" are notoriously controversial as to what defines them.

Take the very first sentence from the SEP entry on Metaphysics:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/

It is not easy to say what metaphysics is.

And your definition of metaphysics is so broad that there is no existent that doesnt fit into it.

If there are well know scientist like Stephen Hawking and Lawrence Krause who deny that philosophy has anything to do with science then how is your claimed defintion a "well understood" "standard" when they claim it is not scientific?

In order to communicate well the ones communicating have to understand the others meaning and their own, not what the majority of others think the definition is of the terms they are using.

Your claim that I "need" to answer the question of how I define "what is science?" because I pointed out that the "philosophy of science" is a general topic that includes any anwer to its central question, is in fact a strawman context dropping claim! Your answeer to the question is not a refutation of the claim that anyones answer to the question is a species of the genus "philosophy of science".

What consensus? That science is a form of metaphysics? See above. Other than that, no, I do not hold that there is a consensus.

See 1-5 and more above. Your whole argument is predicated on it.

Whats more is that you are so engrossed in your own standards that you presume to prescribe normative standards to others evaluation of the strawman topic you think is at issue:

Popper's nonsense? Disregarding, flippant remarks are not dialectic. Leave them out.

What makes you think I care if my evaluation of Popper is not in the category of "dialectic"? Oh, its the "standard" method for discourse right? I beg to differ based on my own answers to the questions of epistemology broadly and the querry "What is science?" in particular, and both of our answers are species of the genus "philosophy of science"....

Zen said:

I do not hold my own epistemic views as the be-all and end-all, but as I said above, I am happy to argue them in a dialectic fashion. So far you only know that I regard science as a form of metaphysics, and that my meta question is "What differentiates science from other forms of metaphysics?", and that I generally hold with Popperian type views.

And that you regard your views of the philosophy of science as the standard others must differentiate themselves from or be asserters of the "arbitrary"! I dont know what you mean by "be all and end all" here but you obviously dont classify that type of classification as a "standard" for what genus science falls into such that a "be all end all " view is "well understood" by "Popperian types"....unless you are contradicting yourself of course.

That you are happy to defend your own chosen "Popperian type view" and that I have no interest in debating on Popper right now has nothing to do with what started this discussion-what is at issue. That is what you dont seem to understand.

I have debated on Popper quite a bit elsewhere and you can google my user name to find those threads.

If you want an idea of many of my own problems with Popper you can read this:


http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/philn/philn065.htm

I dont agree with everything Dykes say here though.

Have you actually read his original material?

I have read most of all 5 books I own by Popper as well as many others commentary on him. Stove for instance...
I regard Popper as having gotten almost nothing correct and lacking any answers to what I regard as the central issues of epistemology on principle. That is, Popper regards what I categorize as epistemology as a species of a different genus than science. We therefore have different understandings of "the limitations of science" and dont have the same standards for what is a valid philosophy of science.....

I will answer what I think science is with the proviso that it has no bearing on my initial claim.

Science is a process of systematic collection and compilation of knowledge for the purpose of sustaining and enhancing the life of beings with a conceptual consciousness.

There are two species of science 1).general and 2). special-specific, characterized by the availability of the facts that fall within each.

All the philosophical sciences are concerned with the questions that involve ubiquitously available facts and are implicit in any state of awareness. Metaphysics falls in this category and is the base of all the hierarchy of knowledge. All other questions pressupose you have an answer to these questions because all predications pressupose their existence implicitly. You cannot deny their existence without reaffirming them. All knowledge logically pressuposes them. Failure to explicitly identify these facts causes ripples all the way up the hierarchy of knowledge and will effect the integration of the rest of ones premises and conclusions.

The special sciences involve the questions that require one to be in a specific relation to facts that are not always available or present ubiquitously in awareness. One cannot answer the question "What is the population density of Japan?" without taking specific actions to expose ones self to the facts that enable one to ascertain the answer.This is the basis for the experimental requirements of the special sciences.

William Whewell proposed the term scientist specifically be limited to the second class of facts. Before this Natural Philosophers considered both types to be sciences. See Laura Snyders book The Philosophical Breakfast Club.

So, I regard metaphysics as the general foundational science but I do not regard the special sciences as species of the genus metaphysical as such. No special science can refuse to answer the foundational questions therein without leaving the rest of their knowledge a floating castle with no foundation. However no special science can claim to be a requirement for general knowledge such as metaphysics withought category error because by definition special facts are not general ones...

This is an extremely uncomprehensive characterization and are not required or given as a justification of the actual issue contended between Zen and I....

[ZenMonkeyNZ]

On the basis of your presumption that your categorization/definition of science is "standard" in the philosophy of science and you claim that there is onus on me to define-differentiate my own answer to "what is science".

No, the onus is on you to either (a) ask for my definitions of terms if you think there is something amiss with what I am saying, or (b) to state your own definition of something like “metaphysics” then argue your position. I don’t presume that my definition of science is standard in a conceptual manner, but I do presume basic dictionary definitions when communicating in brief statements. This is a simple requirement of communication.

The very request for my own definition concedes my point! What ever answer I give, whatever genus I argue science is a species of, will by definition be an instance of a different philosophy of science from your own! What's more is, "what is science?" means "What defines science?", which means "what genus and differentia does science fall into?". That makes your answer to the question "what is science?" classifying it as a species of the genus philosophy-metaphysics, by definition, not the question but an aswer to it!

Furthermore your claim that your own view-answer of "what science is" is the standard "well understood" definition is nonsense anyway. Both "science" and "metaphysics" are notoriously controversial as to what defines them.

You are jumping into conceptual analysis, and are confusing that with simple definitions used in communication. Words have dictionary definitions that we use to communicate in non-analytical situations. I think the crux of our issue is that you have jumped into conceptual arguments before clarifying definitions. See below.

Take the very first sentence from the SEP entry on Metaphysics:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/
“It is not easy to say what metaphysics is.”
And your definition of metaphysics is so broad that there is no existent that doesnt fit into it.

This is more like it. You are raising an issue with my definition. The link, however, is does not give a clear definition but is a brief conceptual analysis. This is the wrong place to start, in my view. See below.

Your claim that I "need" to answer the question of how I define "what is science?" because I pointed out that the "philosophy of science" is a general topic that includes any anwer to its central question, is in fact a strawman context dropping claim!

I don’t think I claimed you need to do anything. I asked you to, and you’ll see why below. How can a request be a straw-man?

What makes you think I care if my evaluation of Popper is not in the category of "dialectic"? Oh, its the "standard" method for discourse right? I beg to differ based on my own answers to the questions of epistemology broadly and the querry "What is science?" in particular, and both of our answers are species of the genus "philosophy of science"....

So do you think you just arbitrarily pick what parts of a discussion to approach dialectically? You can, of course, engage in any kind of discourse you like, but non-dialectic discourse leads to dogmatism. The second half of your statement appears confused.

And that you regard your views of the philosophy of science as the standard others must differentiate themselves from or be asserters of the "arbitrary"! I dont know what you mean by "be all and end all" here but you obviously dont classify that type of classification as a "standard" for what genus science falls into such that a "be all end all " view is "well understood" by "Popperian types"....unless you are contradicting yourself of course.

I have tried to deconstruct this to see what you meant, but it is too haphazard, sorry.

If you want an idea of many of my own problems with Popper you can read this:
http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/philn/philn065.htm
I dont agree with everything Dykes say here though.

Cool, thanks. This kind of criticism is always interesting.

I note the first criticism – of the problem of induction – is based on the law of identity. I do not see this as a sound argument. It confuses an entity with its description or conceptual class. This is a basic epistemic mistake. The description of an entity should never be equated with the entity in-and-of-itself. A map is not the terrain. We can never be sure that our description of an entity is accurate enough to avoid the problem of induction. But that is another discussion . . .

We therefore have different understandings of "the limitations of science" and dont have the same standards for what is a valid philosophy of science.....

This is the crux of our issue, as I see it, and relates to a couple of the previous comments above. What you say here is correct, we do have different understandings about the limitations of science. However, I used basic definitions (don’t confuse these with conceptual analysis of terms) because that is the basis for communication. Words have commonly accepted meanings. We are allowed to use them! Rather than attack what was said on the grounds that you see the likelihood of differing conceptual ideas, I would advocate asking basic clarifying questions, or else stating your own definitions and proposing opposing arguments from there.

For example, a simple question would have been: “What do you think the limitations of science are, and how do you define science?” And when I said that science is a kind of metaphysics, a simple question would be: “How do you define metaphysics”. We started to get there eventually, I think. You think my definition of metaphysics is too broad.

Below are the kinds of questions I would expect to answer if delving deeper into a (series of) statement(s).

I will answer what I think science is with the proviso that it has no bearing on my initial claim.

Science is a process of systematic collection and compilation of knowledge for the purpose of sustaining and enhancing the life of beings with a conceptual consciousness . . . All the philosophical sciences are concerned with the questions that involve ubiquitously available facts and are implicit in any state of awareness. Metaphysics falls in this category and is the base of all the hierarchy of knowledge. All other questions pressupose you have an answer to these questions because all predications pressupose their existence implicitly. You cannot deny their existence without reaffirming them. All knowledge logically pressuposes them. Failure to explicitly identify these facts causes ripples all the way up the hierarchy of knowledge and will effect the integration of the rest of ones premises and conclusions . . . So, I regard metaphysics as the general foundational science but I do not regard the special sciences as species of the genus metaphysical as such. No special science can refuse to answer the foundational questions therein without leaving the rest of their knowledge a floating castle with no foundation. However no special science can claim to be a requirement for general knowledge such as metaphysics withought category error because by definition special facts are not general ones...

Thanks for this.

Note that your statements are subject to the same kind of criticism you made of my initial statement. However, clarifying questions are a better way to explore someone’s statement(s).

Here are some clarifying questions I would start with:

(a) What is the reasoning behind the “purpose” part of the statement in the first sentence? And is the purpose a requirement?

(b) If the purpose is a requirement, how do you define knowledge as that which enhances “the life of beings with a conceptual consciousness” – i.e. what do you mean by enhance? Does it need to enhance the lives of all conceptually conscious beings, and if so, how would you ever know if that is the case?

(c) Define knowledge.

(d) If science is a process, as you have stated, explain what you mean by a systematic collection and compilation [of knowledge]. How does one determine what is classed under this systematic collection, and what is not? In other words, what are the criteria for a process to be considered scientific or not?

[Plasmatic]

Zen, we are still not communicating on the essential issue. Until we do I will not engage the periphery issues surrounding the failure to understand or address my point. Most of your statements will make no sense in light of what you are missing.

Are you willing to state what you think I see as the issue clearly? Will you try to state why I think my initial statement required no questions to be asked?

We can clear this up alot quicker if you give 2 or 3 examples of the limitations you were claiming are "well understood".

Edit: You have witnessed me use the Socratic method to reduce fundamental premises to absurdity in another thread. I know well how to ask the pertinent questions to get at others premises. The purpose of a question is tied to the intentional state of the asker....So are declarative statements.

Here is a question to attempt to get us to the right issues.

If the "philosophy of science" includes any number of views on what the "limitations of science" are, then how can the statement " the limitations of science are well understood in the philosophy of science" be an accurate representation what the philosophy of science is?