What is Real?

What is a human being? What is life? Can science give us reliable answers to such questions? The electricity of life. The meaning of human consciousness. Are we alone? Are the traditional contests between science and religion still relevant? Does the word "spirit" still hold meaning today?

Moderators: MGmirkin, bboyer

Locked
Divinity
Guest

Re: What is Real?

Post by Divinity » Thu Nov 20, 2008 5:59 pm

Plasmatic wrote:
I am glad we are visualising the same thing but how did you come to that conclusion considering it isn't 'logical' and you can't prove it? If it's not an object, how do you define it?


Without adding to Altons assertions,as all observations of dynamic relationships amongst objects are conceptualized,one describes the most essential charachteristics of the particular percieved instance. Spin is not an object but I can demonstrate it by controlling the relational interaction of objects.
Do you mean we know something exists because of the effect it has on other things, Plasmatic?

If so, how is that relevant to 'knowing' the universe is infinite with no edges? How did Alton conclude, scientifically, what I know to be true, that the Universe is infinite with no edges? Or did he, too, just 'know' or is he guessing and if so, what does he base the guess on?

Thanks.

Divinity
Guest

Re: What is Real?

Post by Divinity » Thu Nov 20, 2008 6:13 pm

altonhare wrote: 2) This is exactly backwards. A tree is there whether I point to it or not. A concept has no meaning without the object. What meaning can motion have without some THING (object) moving??? What meaning can distance have without two objects??? What meaning can jump have without an object jumping? Concepts have no meaning without objects. I don't know where you got such a misguided notion from. There is no concept with meaning without objects.
Lets make sure we have these two points straight before we go talking about the rest of your post.
Aha! Herein lies the communication problem we have been having, methinks.

I can visualise and imagine concepts which are not attached to objects but it seems you cannot.

If I asked you to conceptually imagine a voice similar to Pavarotti's but female, could you do so? And if so, what would be the object attached to that concept if such an object didn't exist?

It's the strength of the human mind to imagine concepts which have never been considered before. Tesla must have had a concept that he could "create storms down the bottom of his road"....he didn't need to attach the concept to the invention immediately. The apparatus came AFTER the concept. The concept was the potential...the object was what made the potential happen. Surely?

Grey Cloud
Posts: 2477
Joined: Sun Apr 13, 2008 5:47 am
Location: NW UK

Re: What is Real?

Post by Grey Cloud » Thu Nov 20, 2008 7:37 pm

Divinity wrote:
If I asked you to conceptually imagine a voice similar to Pavarotti's but female, could you do so? And if so, what would be the object attached to that concept if such an object didn't exist?
'It aint over til the fat lady sings'? :shock:
If I have the least bit of knowledge
I will follow the great Way alone
and fear nothing but being sidetracked.
The great Way is simple
but people delight in complexity.
Tao Te Ching, 53.

Plasmatic
Posts: 800
Joined: Thu Mar 13, 2008 11:14 pm

Re: What is Real?

Post by Plasmatic » Thu Nov 20, 2008 8:28 pm

Do you mean we know something exists because of the effect it has on other things, Plasmatic?

If so, how is that relevant to 'knowing' the universe is infinite with no edges? How did Alton conclude, scientifically, what I know to be true, that the Universe is infinite with no edges? Or did he, too, just 'know' or is he guessing and if so, what does he base the guess on?

Thanks.
Not exactly. We know that there is something that caused the observed effects .[im NOT talking of ghosts] The principles of logic are used in the process of inducing and deducing any valid conclusion. An "infinite" universe is invalid as such. Is like saying "you have a jar that contains no specific[ particular] number of marbles" .

The axioms are a result of ubiquitous observations available to all. Logic rests upon these axioms.Alton concludes this the same way one concluses that "square-circles" are invalid concepts.
"Logic is the art of non-contradictory identification"......" I am therefore Ill think"
Ayn Rand
"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it."
Aristotle

Divinity
Guest

Re: What is Real?

Post by Divinity » Fri Nov 21, 2008 3:22 am

Grey Cloud wrote:Divinity wrote:
If I asked you to conceptually imagine a voice similar to Pavarotti's but female, could you do so? And if so, what would be the object attached to that concept if such an object didn't exist?
'It aint over til the fat lady sings'? :shock:
:D Well, it's the best answer I've had so far, GC :D

Plasmatic
Posts: 800
Joined: Thu Mar 13, 2008 11:14 pm

Re: What is Real?

Post by Plasmatic » Fri Nov 21, 2008 11:41 am

Aha! Herein lies the communication problem we have been having, methinks.

I can visualise and imagine concepts which are not attached to objects but it seems you cannot.

If I asked you to conceptually imagine a voice similar to Pavarotti's but female, could you do so? And if so, what would be the object attached to that concept if such an object didn't exist?

It's the strength of the human mind to imagine concepts which have never been considered before. Tesla must have had a concept that he could "create storms down the bottom of his road"....he didn't need to attach the concept to the invention immediately. The apparatus came AFTER the concept. The concept was the potential...the object was what made the potential happen. Surely?
This is called abstracting from abstractions. However your post defies your statement.
If I asked you to conceptually imagine a voice similar to Pavarotti's but female, could you do so? And if so, what would be the object attached to that concept if such an object didn't exist?
These are all abstractions out from percieved instances of objects or relationships thereof . Helen Keller could not relate to sight or sound but her power of relating her only perception to objects where unlocked when she realized the connection of percepts to concepts.

Your example is also a false analogy.To be what Alton has pointed at youd have to say that there EXISTS a voice as described apart from any singer. seperating the verb from the noun existentially.
"Logic is the art of non-contradictory identification"......" I am therefore Ill think"
Ayn Rand
"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it."
Aristotle

altonhare
Posts: 1212
Joined: Sun Oct 12, 2008 9:54 am
Location: Baltimore
Contact:

Re: What is Real?

Post by altonhare » Fri Nov 21, 2008 12:34 pm

Divinity wrote:
altonhare wrote:
This is the kind of universe I hypothesize. There is no creation and no destruction. There is no boundary. Space has no boundary, it's not an object.

I would also like to point out that thread/chain theory provides plausible mechanisms for things like telepathy and "ghosts" (events happening with no visible entities). As I went over in my exist thread it is entirely possible and plausible for objects to influence us physically without transferring "electromagnetic radiation".
I am glad we are visualising the same thing but how did you come to that conclusion considering it isn't 'logical' and you can't prove it? If it's not an object, how do you define it?

Thanks.
If it's not an object it doesn't have shape. Simple.

This conclusion is arrived at by applying Identity, i.e. non self contradiction, which involves (among other things) defining my terms in a single way and only using them that way. An object is that which has shape. Space is not an object because it does not have shape. You cannot show a picture or model of "space". That which has no shape has no boundary (shape and boundary are synonymous). Space is boundless by definition. Trying to "find a boundary" to space is a self-contradiction. It's like looking for the edge of a perfect sphere. Additionally, "create" in the context of "creating the universe" means that something comes from nothing (a contradiction). If the universe is everything (all the somethings) that exist, then creating the universe is a logical fallacy, a contradiction. I went over this particular aspect in the "exist" thread, I believe.

This is not a guess, it is a conclusion that follows logically (non-contradictory) from the premises.
Divinity wrote:I can visualise and imagine concepts which are not attached to objects but it seems you cannot.
As soon as you *visualize* you invoke a shape i.e. an object. If you are visualizing you are invoking objects. So, I believe you are mistaken.
Divinity wrote:If I asked you to conceptually imagine a voice similar to Pavarotti's but female, could you do so? And if so, what would be the object attached to that concept if such an object didn't exist?
Ahh, you have not read carefully my definitions of exist and object. And object has shape. An object that has shape and location exists. Of course you can imagine an object that doesn't exist. The image you are picturing in your mind has shape but does not have location. The objects that interact in your brain/body all have shape and location, but not the object you are picturing.

Unfortunately I don't know who Pavarotti is. But if I did, I could imagine this. I can picture Pav as a female maybe, or Pav as a male with the sultry soliloquy of a mistress of the night. This voice is tied to something with shape. But not something with shape and location.
Divinity wrote: It's the strength of the human mind to imagine concepts which have never been considered before.
We agree on much, Divinity. I have stated this elsewhere on these forums. Intelligence may be a vague term and many animals may beat us in one thing or another, but no other animal can challenge humans in our ability to pursue thought purely for thought's sake. Whereas other animals typically have intelligence that is directly devoted to their existence, we pursue lines of thought purely for the sake of thinking/creativity/imagination. This is great. Sometimes these endeavors end up actually having a bearing on existence, something no other animal would have figured out because they would have never pursued such an outrageous line of reasoning. Where we get into trouble is when we reify abstractions. When we are unable to distinguish between something and nothing. When we grant the concepts and ideas we have created mystical abilities such as being both a something and what something does. When we treat concepts as objects themselves. Or when we embrace contradiction so that our preconceived idea of how things should function still "works". Humans, precisely because of our capacity for abstraction, need criteria for filtering their thoughts and ideas more than any other animal. It's easy to reify as a human because we abstract so effortlessly. The first criteria is Identity, non self contradiction, the explanations for phenomena we come up with that fill this criteria we call science. We reserve words like religion and mysticism for other explanations/ideas.
Divinity wrote:Tesla must have had a concept that he could "create storms down the bottom of his road"....he didn't need to attach the concept to the invention immediately. The apparatus came AFTER the concept. The concept was the potential...the object was what made the potential happen. Surely?
First off, invention/technology is not science. Cave men figured out how to make fire by bashing rocks together without knowing anything about chemistry, atoms, friction, etc. Tesla had remarkable intuition about how components might work together. He was an inventor, not a scientist. He had an immense working knowledge of electrical engineering in addition to a quick mind and a photographic memory. When you're that familiar with every detailed aspect of your field, it's easy to see where the gaps in the field are, where the "fertile ground" lies ready to be plowed. His imaginings were purely inspiration. The apparatus was a matter of trying things nobody had tried before. Because of his mental prowess he was better able to pick out new physical constructs that had the most promise of working.

This goes back to an object versus an object with location. Tesla's imaginings *still* involved objects. He would picture things acting a certain way and producing some effect, these were the concepts. Humans can imagine almost anything. Tesla then worked with electrical components, with his working knowledge, intuition, and keen mind until he struck upon the "right combination". He could have been imagining fairy dust or gremlins making things happen a certain way, it didn't matter. He was probably the most creative and imaginative inventor who ever lived.
Physicist: This is a pen

Mathematician: It's pi*r2*h

User avatar
Antone
Posts: 148
Joined: Fri Jun 27, 2008 5:28 pm
Contact:

Re: What is Real?

Post by Antone » Fri Nov 21, 2008 7:41 pm

altonhare wrote: 1) You have things a bit mixed up. Entity and object are synonyms. An object/entity is that which has shape or a specific arrangement of shapes.
Obviously, I am using the words in a specific sense--to mean what I want them to mean. And that is the sense in which an object is a physical thing, while an entity is a non-physical thing.

Moreover, this is hardly as much of a stretch as you seem to be claiming. According to my dictionary, an object is defined as 1) a thing that can be seen or touched; material thing that occupies space.

The philosophy definition defines an object as anything that can be known or perceived by the mind. So that is the opposite of what both of us are calling an object. My definition instead refers to what is typically referred to in plain English when we talk about an object.

As for an Entity, my dictionary defines it as: 1) being; existence 2) a thing that has definite, individual existence outside or within the mind; anything real in itself.

A thought has real existence--but it is not a physical object. It is an entity because (although it is real) it is not physical. We see this same sense reflected in the title of the book/movie The Entity--where an unseen apparition repeatedly assults a woman. Again, we see that the thing is real--it causes effects to happen in the real/physical world--but it has no physical presence. It cannot be seen or touched, like a physical object can be.

In every way, this is precisely the distinction that I was trying to capture. An entity is just as real as an object--but it lacks the physical aspect. However, the confusion that you've stated, is the reason that I generally try to say [physical object] and [conceputal entity] instead of just saying [object] and [entity].
altonhare wrote:A concept is a relationship between two or more objects/entities. Distance is a concept because it involves TWO objects. Motion is a concept because an object must move in comparison to another object. A tree is not a concept. It's a tree. Concepts have opposites, up is the opposite of down, mass is the opposite of mass-less, and push is the opposite of pull. But tree is not the opposite of "no tree".
I strongly disagree. (1) Not all concects involve a relationship of any kind. For example, it could be a mirror reflection of a single object--the only difference being that the [object] is physical and the [conceptual entity] is not.(2) A concept can be a relationship between two concepts--as easily as it is between two physical objects.

A tree is not a concept... True enough.

But the word "tree" refers to both a [conceptual entity] and a [physical object] while being neither of those things to which it refers. A specific [physical tree] is a single instance of the [concept tree]. But both of those things are distinctly differnt from the word "tree" that you are reading on your screen.

The [concept tree] is something that has no physical presence. And we know that it is a distinctly different thing from a physical tree because--once again--it has differnt characteristics. The [concept aspect] refers to [many physical trees], while being itself a [single thing]. Two things which have distinctly different characteristics cannot be the same thing--so we know that [objects] and [entities] are distinctly different aspects, even if they are identical in many ways.
altonhare wrote: 2) This is exactly backwards. A tree is there whether I point to it or not. A concept has no meaning without the object. What meaning can motion have without some THING (object) moving???
Yes, a tree is there whether I point to it or not. That's goes along with what I said about an [object] being what it is. I also agree that (generally speaking) a concept must have an object on which it is based. Mythical creatures, like Unicorns, have statues and books and such on which they are based. And even the first time a writer created the idea of a unicorn, it was based on things that exist: a horse and a horn. The fact that no actual animal exists that exhibits those characteristics doesn't mean that the concept isn't based on ideas.

There is at least one exception... and that is the concept of nothing. Even that, however, can only be defined with respect to physical objects which do not exist. So I think you make a decent argument--but it does not contradict anything that I've said. Just because [objects] are defined by [concepts] doesn't mean that [concepts] aren't also defined by [objects]. That, in fact is the whole basis of my argument. They are each defined by the other.
Just as the fact that x = [y + z] means that [y + z] = x. Things that are equivalent must necessarily define one another.

An equivalency implies that there are some things about each statement that are the same--but there are also things that are different. This is necessarily the case for every definition that has actual meaning. [x = x] is exactly the same on both sides--but it tells us nothing about what [x] is. On the other hand, [x] and [y + z] are different, but one explains what we mean by the other.

[All the physical objects that are trees] define what it means conceptually to be a [tree]. But we can also reverse that, and use that vague conceputal image to evaluate whether something new that we have never seen before and looks very little like any of the [physical objects that we are familiar with] is a tree or not. If this weren't the case, we would not be able to look at a fantasy landscape drawn by Boris and observe that those funny looking shapes in his painting are obviously alien trees. We know that they are trees because they satisfy all of the conceptual requirements that define what it means to be a tree--so they don't have to be identical to what we've already seen.

It is this ability to generalize [actual physical objects] based their [defining concepts] that allows us to recognize people that we haven't seen for a long time. And (I believe) it is responsible for many other of the most advanced mental processes that we perform.
altonhare wrote: 2) What meaning can distance have without two objects??? What meaning can jump have without an object jumping? Concepts have no meaning without objects. I don't know where you got such a misguided notion from. There is no concept with meaning without objects.
You may have had a somewhat decent argument with motion... but it is much weaker for distance. Distance is defined more by empty space than it is by objects. All I have to do to prove this is to pick two arbitrary points in open space. Is there not a specific distance between those two points?

Can I not imagine a unicorn jumping? Since a unicorn is a mythical creature, it cannot be a physical object that is jumping. It is a concept of a physical object that is jumping, so in a sense, it does come back to an object--but again, that only supports my claim that it goes both ways. If it didn't, then you wouldn't be able to get such convoluted layerings of objects inside concepts of objects that are only conceptual... etc.

There is no concept with meaning without objects.

Traditionally, a set is thought to be [that which contains elements]; while the empty set is understood to be the [set that doesn't contain any elements]. I think this probably qualifies as a concept that is devoid of objects. Ironically, the way I define an empty set, you are closer to being right. In my personal theory (DS theory of sets) the traditional definition of an empty set is an oxymoron that is inherently paradoxical. How can [that which contains elements] NOT contain elements?

In my theory, there is a clear distinction between [enumeration sets] and [abstraction sets]. We can not enumerate the empty set, because the empty set contains [nothing]. But we can abstract is as follows:
{x:x is nothing}
This abstraction set contains one element:the concept of [nothing]. Thus, it contains [one thing] and yet "nothing" at the same time. Thus, even this concept is in a sense defined by a physical object.

In another sense, nothing is defined by the absence of physical objects. Even the strongest vacuum is teaming with atoms and subatomic particles. So nowhere in the universe is there an actual example of nothing. The only way to demonstrate physically what "nothing" is is to identify a concept that isn't within a limited physical range. For instance, there are no apples on my desk. But there are apples at the store.
altonhare wrote: Lets make sure we have these two points straight before we go talking about the rest of your post.
Sorry it's taken me so long to reply... I wasn't looking for your posts. But I look forward to your response.

User avatar
Antone
Posts: 148
Joined: Fri Jun 27, 2008 5:28 pm
Contact:

Re: What is Real?

Post by Antone » Fri Nov 21, 2008 9:17 pm

altonhare wrote: 1) You have things a bit mixed up. Entity and object are synonyms. An object/entity is that which has shape or a specific arrangement of shapes.
Obviously, I am using the words in a specific sense--to mean what I want them to mean. And that is the sense in which an object is a physical thing, while an entity is a non-physical thing.

Moreover, this is hardly as much of a stretch as you seem to be claiming. According to my dictionary, an object is defined as 1) a thing that can be seen or touched; material thing that occupies space. Based on this, I think it is clear that your definition is much more of a stretch than mine. The philosophy definition defines an object as anything that can be known or perceived by the mind, so in that sense, your definition is more accurate. However, I am not simply regurgitating mainstream theory here--I'm stating ideas from my own personal theory. And my definition refers to what is typically referred to in plain English when we talk about an object. It is something that physically exists.

As for an Entity, my dictionary defines it as: 1) being; existence 2) a thing that has definite, individual existence outside or within the mind; anything real in itself.

A thought has real existence--but it is not a physical object. It is an entity because (although it is real) it is not physical. We see this same sense reflected in the title of the book/movie The Entity--where an unseen apparition repeatedly assults a woman. Again, we see that the thing is real--it causes effects to happen in the real/physical world--but it has no physical presence. It cannot be seen or touched, like a physical object can be.

In every way, this is precisely the distinction that I was trying to capture. An entity is just as real as an object--but it lacks the physical aspect. However, the confusion that you've stated, is the reason that I generally try to say [physical object] and [conceputal entity] instead of just saying [object] and [entity].
altonhare wrote:A concept is a relationship between two or more objects/entities. Distance is a concept because it involves TWO objects. Motion is a concept because an object must move in comparison to another object. A tree is not a concept. It's a tree. Concepts have opposites, up is the opposite of down, mass is the opposite of mass-less, and push is the opposite of pull. But tree is not the opposite of "no tree".
I strongly disagree. (1) Not all concects involve a relationship of any kind. For example, it could be a mirror reflection of a single object--the only difference being that the [object] is physical and the [conceptual entity] is not.(2) A concept can be a relationship between two concepts--as easily as it is between two physical objects.

A tree is not a concept... True enough.

But the word "tree" refers to both a [conceptual entity] and a [physical object] while being neither of those things to which it refers. A specific [physical tree] is a single instance of the [concept tree]. But both of those things are distinctly differnt from the word "tree" that you are reading on your screen.

The [concept tree] is something that has no physical presence. And we know that it is a distinctly different thing from a physical tree because--once again--it has differnt characteristics. The [concept aspect] refers to [many physical trees], while being itself a [single thing]. Two things which have distinctly different characteristics cannot be the same thing--so we know that [objects] and [entities] are distinctly different aspects, even if they are identical in many ways.
altonhare wrote: 2) This is exactly backwards. A tree is there whether I point to it or not. A concept has no meaning without the object. What meaning can motion have without some THING (object) moving???
Yes, a tree is there whether I point to it or not. That's goes along with what I said about an [object] being what it is. I also agree that (generally speaking) a concept must have an object on which it is based. Mythical creatures, like Unicorns, have statues and books and such on which they are based. And even the first time a writer created the idea of a unicorn, it was based on things that exist: a horse and a horn. The fact that no actual animal exists that exhibits those characteristics doesn't mean that the concept isn't based on ideas.

There is at least one exception... and that is the concept of nothing. Even that, however, can only be defined with respect to physical objects which do not exist. So I think you make a decent argument--but it does not contradict anything that I've said. Just because [objects] are defined by [concepts] doesn't mean that [concepts] aren't also defined by [objects]. That, in fact is the whole basis of my argument. They are each defined by the other.
Just as the fact that x = [y + z] means that [y + z] = x. Things that are equivalent must necessarily define one another.

An equivalency implies that there are some things about each statement that are the same--but there are also things that are different. This is necessarily the case for every definition that has actual meaning. [x = x] is exactly the same on both sides--but it tells us nothing about what [x] is. On the other hand, [x] and [y + z] are different, but one explains what we mean by the other.

[All the physical objects that are trees] define what it means conceptually to be a [tree]. But we can also reverse that, and use that vague conceputal image to evaluate whether something new that we have never seen before and looks very little like any of the [physical objects that we are familiar with] is a tree or not. If this weren't the case, we would not be able to look at a fantasy landscape drawn by Boris and observe that those funny looking shapes in his painting are obviously alien trees. We know that they are trees because they satisfy all of the conceptual requirements that define what it means to be a tree--so they don't have to be identical to what we've already seen.

It is this ability to generalize [actual physical objects] based their [defining concepts] that allows us to recognize people that we haven't seen for a long time. And (I believe) it is responsible for many other of the most advanced mental processes that we perform.
altonhare wrote: 2) What meaning can distance have without two objects??? What meaning can jump have without an object jumping? Concepts have no meaning without objects. I don't know where you got such a misguided notion from. There is no concept with meaning without objects.
You may have had a somewhat decent argument with motion... but it is much weaker for distance. Distance is defined more by empty space than it is by objects. All I have to do to prove this is to pick two arbitrary points in open space. Is there not a specific distance between those two points?

Can I not imagine a unicorn jumping? Since a unicorn is a mythical creature, it cannot be a physical object that is jumping. It is a concept of a physical object that is jumping, so in a sense, it does come back to an object--but again, that only supports my claim that it goes both ways. If it didn't, then you wouldn't be able to get such convoluted layerings of objects inside concepts of objects that are only conceptual... etc.

There is no concept with meaning without objects.

Traditionally, a set is thought to be [that which contains elements]; while the empty set is understood to be the [set that doesn't contain any elements]. I think this probably qualifies as a concept that is devoid of objects. Ironically, the way I define an empty set, you are closer to being right. In my personal theory (DS theory of sets) the traditional definition of an empty set is an oxymoron that is inherently paradoxical. How can [that which contains elements] NOT contain elements?

In my theory, there is a clear distinction between [enumeration sets] and [abstraction sets]. We can not enumerate the empty set, because the empty set contains [nothing]. But we can abstract is as follows:
{x:x is nothing}
This abstraction set contains one element:the concept of [nothing]. Thus, it contains [one thing] and yet "nothing" at the same time. Thus, even this concept is in a sense defined by a physical object.

In another sense, nothing is defined by the absence of physical objects. Even the strongest vacuum is teaming with atoms and subatomic particles. So nowhere in the universe is there an actual example of nothing. The only way to demonstrate physically what "nothing" is is to identify a concept that isn't within a limited physical range. For instance, there are no apples on my desk. But there are apples at the store.
altonhare wrote: Lets make sure we have these two points straight before we go talking about the rest of your post.
Sorry it's taken me so long to reply... I wasn't looking for your posts. But I look forward to your response

User avatar
Antone
Posts: 148
Joined: Fri Jun 27, 2008 5:28 pm
Contact:

Re: What is Real?

Post by Antone » Sat Nov 22, 2008 8:25 pm

altonhare wrote:The right side of the equation is relative... because neither [y], [z] nor [+] are [x]. And even when you put them all together they still aren't [x]... they explain what it means to be [x]... buty they are not themselves [x].
The main problem that I notice is that you do not distinguish between objects and relationships among objects (concepts).
Of course I distinguish between [objects] and [relationships]. The whole structure of my theory is based upon the importance of such distinctions. The difference (as I see it) is that I understand that this distinction is important instead of being meaningless trivia that doesn’t change anything.

The right side of the equation is not "relative". It is a specific relationship between the objects (or between relationships among objects) referred to by the symbols y and z.
I don’t know if you saw my definition of what relative means, so I’ll post it again
Relative things are exemplified by multiple instances.
Now, [y] and [z] are more than one thing. So that makes them multiple instances. You are of course correct that it is the relationship between them that is significant, so I should probably refine my definition yet again to be:
Relative things are thing which are exemplified by multiple instances, or are defined by the relationship between multiple qualities.
X could represent the spatial arrangement of the head and body of a lion while y and z are the spatial arrangements of the head and body respectively. There is no reason to call this "relative". This equation expresses that X is a specific relationship between y and z.
This is true, as far as it goes. But [x] is not the same thing as [the relationship between y and z]. They are equivalent but not identical. In your terms [x] is the [whole lion] while [y and z] are [body and head] of the lion. Clearly, a [headless lion body] is quite different from a [whole lion].
This is analogous to the distinction between a [set] and the [elements] of a set. In one sense, the [set] is the [absolute aspect] because it is singular—while the [elements] are generally [relative] because there are many elements in most sets. But we can also invert our thinking and consider each individual [element] to be the more [absolute aspect] because each element is more specific and unique than the set, which is vague enough to contain (or define) all the elements.
Both of these ways of seeing the reality of the [set/element relationship] are valid. That’s why arguing over whether something is [absolute] or [relative] is such a slippery argument. Because in one sense or another it is always both. What is important, then, is not to determine which it is, but rather to determine why it can be both.
Let’s look at a similar but different example. Lets let [x] be the 24 hour day, or [all day] and [y] be [day] and [z] be [night]. Now we have:
All day = day + night.
Now [all day] is clearly different from [day] because it has a period of time that is [dark]. And it is different from [night] because it has a period that is [light]. Clearly, [day] and [night] are parts of [all day]. But that’s the important distinction. [all day] has no parts it is a singular whole. There is no single quality about [all day] that makes [day and night] necessary wholes. For instance there is generally about 12 hours of [day] and 12 hours of [night]. But if we’re in Alaska, that might be quite different. Or what if we’re in a plane at [high noon] travelling in the direction of the sun at a rate of one time zone per hour. In a sense, it will always be day as long as we keep flying.
So [day] and [night] are simply conceptual ideas that we place on a natural physical phenomenon.
altonhare wrote:Clearly [2] is not the exact same thing as [1 + 1] because [2] is a single symbol, while [1 + 1] is three symbols.

Same thing here, we have to keep in mind what these symbols actually refer to. 1 is a concept as well as 2 and +. "1" expresses the concept that some object X is at least a distance D away from any other object or from any object in the set A. 2 expresses the concept that 2 objects Y and Z are within a distance D of each other while no other objects in the set A are within some distance of Y or Z. The "+" symbol expresses that one or more objects specified by the symbol before it (like a 1) moves within a specific distance D of one or more objects specified by the symbol after the + (perhaps another 1). The "=" symbol means that the moving is done and all the object(s) specified by the symbols around the + are now within a distance D of each other.

I’m sorry, but I have to say that you’re assuming way too much about this equation. We cannot assume that the equation has anything at all to do with distances. Or objects. Or any other specific concept except one.

The one thing that we can know about [1] is that it refers to an [arbitrary unit]. If a strange man approaches you on the street and says, “I have [1].” His statement is meaningless gibberish until you figure out [what it is that he has one of]. In mathematics, it is not uncommon to use [1] without a [unit of measure], but the only reason that this can be done is because we are assigning an arbitrary unit to it.

[1 arbitrary unit] plus the [same arbitrary unit] equals [two of those arbitrary units]. In other words, we don’t know what the arbitrary unit is, but we know that all the numbers apply to the [same arbitrary unit].
When dealing with actual physical objects, however, the problem with this idea is that each physical object is unique. For example, no two physical apples will be exactly the same size, shape, content and color. One may be sweeter. One may have spots in different places. One may have a longer or thicker stem. One may have more or less seeds. One may weigh more or less. Etc. etc. ‘

What makes one apple the same as another (and thus a similar unit that we can count) is the fact that all of these apples are made identical by the fact that they all satisfy the requirements of a single concept: {x: x is an apple}. It is the [conceptual aspect of apple] that makes them identical—not the [physical aspect of apple].

Thus, one side of the equation is relative, because it looks at the apples as individual units that are each totally unique. While the other side looks at the apples as units that are both the same. Two things that are the same is not the same thing as two things that are different… So again, we see that there is an aspect in which the two sides of the equation are different—even though there is also an aspect in which the two sides are the same.

User avatar
junglelord
Posts: 3693
Joined: Mon Mar 17, 2008 5:39 am
Location: Canada

Re: What is Real?

Post by junglelord » Sat Nov 22, 2008 8:29 pm

Your right on Antone. I agree 100% with you.
If you only knew the magnificence of the 3, 6 and 9, then you would have a key to the universe.
— Nikola Tesla
Casting Out the Nines from PHI into Indigs reveals the Cosmic Harmonic Code.
— Junglelord.
Knowledge is Structured in Consciouness. Structure and Function Cannot Be Seperated.
— Junglelord

User avatar
Antone
Posts: 148
Joined: Fri Jun 27, 2008 5:28 pm
Contact:

Re: What is Real?

Post by Antone » Sat Nov 22, 2008 8:31 pm

altonhare wrote:Now we can understand this physical reality in two distinctly different and reciprocal ways.
(1) we can think of it as two individual apples/elements... {A1, A2}
(2) we can think of it as a single collection difined as all the apples on my desk...
{x:x is all the apples on my desk}.


You must distinguish between 1, the individual apples as objects, and 2, a concept defined in terms of a relationship between the two apples. These are not "reciprocal". "2" is actually defined in terms of "1". Objects are primaries, we define concepts in terms of objects. There is no reason for anything to be "relative".

Once again… the [distinguishing between] that you mention is exactly what I AM doing. I am refusing to arbitrarily ignore one of those distinctions, the way you are apparently doing. And the reason for doing so is not arbitrary either. I do it because doing so allows me to resolve many problems and paradoxes that appear to be unresolvable using other theoretical constructions.

In other words, the DS theory simply works—without exception.
altonhare wrote:These are two incompatible ways of understanding the exact same physical reality. The reality doesn't change just because we can understand it in two different ways. So it continues to be exactly what it is. But the fact that we can understand it in two different ways makes it relative.

Incorrect. They are not incompatible in the slightest. The second is conceptual and refers to the objects named in the first. The second is defined in terms of the first. The second definition is meaningless without the first! They are inextricably linked.
It’s like two puzzle pieces. The reason they fit together is because they are reciprocal in nature. They are inverted images of the other. So in a sense, they are compatible—that’s why they fit together—and perhaps I could have expressed this a little differently.

But the bottom line is that they are incompatible in another sense. Eating only [imaginary food] is incompatible with the goal of [staying alive]. [Imaginary food] sustains [imaginary people] but it is incompatible with [sustaining real people]. Similarly, [real food] is incompatible with [sustaining imaginary people]. [Imaginary people] cannot eat [real food] any more than [real people] can eat [imaginary food]. Obviously, [imaginary people] don’t need to eat any food to “survive” because they aren’t alive. But in a story that is based on realism, any character who never eats will eventually die. So that character does indeed require [imaginary food] in order to survive. A child who reads the story and doesn’t want the character to die can’t make the character live by giving it [real food].

In a way, this is obviously a somewhat silly example, because the child can imagine anything that they want to happen to that character. They can imagine (in their alternate version of the original story) that the character gets [imaginary food] or that the character is superhuman and doesn’t need food. But even if they do these things, it is physically impossible for the [imaginary character] is never sustained by [real food].

In your criticism, you contradict yourself—because a concept is not physical. Yet you seem to be saying that somehow they are. But as I’ve said before, (and I think that one of the most basic and obvious of logical conclusions) is that two things that are different cannot be exactly the same thing. I think that we’ll have to agree that either you’re capable of understanding that or you aren’t. And if you aren’t capable of understanding it then I suspect there’s no point in discussing this topic any further—we’ll just have to agree to disagree—because even if you want to continue the discussion you won’t be able to understand anything else that I have to say.
altonhare wrote:Technically the second definition is a relationship between EVERY apple, i.e. every apple in the universe. This is because you defined "a single collection" as all the apples on your desk. So if any apple in the universe comes within some preset distance of your desk it becomes part of the set "a single collection". This concept "collection" is not incompatible with the object "apple", it *requires* the object apple to have any meaning whatsoever.
I disagree. Once again, it seems to me that you are assuming way too much and jumping to conclusions and relationships that aren’t justified by what is actually stated. There is, of course, the distant relationship that you suggest, because the [apples on my desk] are a part of [every apple in the universe]—just as [every apple in the universe] is a small part of [every fruit in the universe] which is a small part of [every food in the universe] which is a part of [every part of a plant or animal in the universe] which is part of [every bit of matter in the universe]…

But clearly the [second definition] is NOT technically between [every bit of matter in the universe]. And if it isn’t that, then why should we assume that it is between [every apple in the universe].

There is a hierarchal structure, but we cannot simply jump to where ever we want to in that structural chain, unless there is justifiable cause. And I don’t see that you’ve given any.

Every whole has parts…
Every part is a whole…

But just because [A] is a part of which is a part of the [whole C], doesn’t mean that [A] is a part of [C]… it is a sub-part… but technically, a sub-part is something distinctly different from a part.

This is confusing, because informally what you are implying is true… But within a logical argument it is false. Let me demonstrate what I mean with an analogy.

The Container analogy
A set is that which contains one or more elements. In [traditional set theory], a set can contain another set, but in my [DS theory of sets], this is NOT a possibility.

Traditional set theory thinks of a set as a box. Now, obviously, a [smaller box] can be placed inside of a [bigger box]—and both are still boxes.

By contrast, the DS theory makes a distinction between the reciprocal aspects of a [set] and its [elements] by making them analogous to a [container] and [that which is contained]. Now, when the [smaller box] is placed inside of a [bigger box] the [bigger box] is the [container] and the [smaller box] is [that which is contained]. The [bigger box] can be placed inside of an [even bigger box] and within the confines of THAT relationship the [even bigger box] is the [container] and the [bigger box] is [that which is contained].

Notice that (in terms of the relationship between the various boxes) the [even bigger box] doesn’t contain the [smaller box] because the [smaller box] is contained by the [bigger box]—and so it is not an independent object to be contained but simply a part of the [bigger box] which is an independent object in the context of this relationship.

User avatar
junglelord
Posts: 3693
Joined: Mon Mar 17, 2008 5:39 am
Location: Canada

Re: What is Real?

Post by junglelord » Sat Nov 22, 2008 8:41 pm

Antone, your my kind of mind. I love it.
100% behind everyword you spoke.
:D :mrgreen: :geek: :ugeek:
If you only knew the magnificence of the 3, 6 and 9, then you would have a key to the universe.
— Nikola Tesla
Casting Out the Nines from PHI into Indigs reveals the Cosmic Harmonic Code.
— Junglelord.
Knowledge is Structured in Consciouness. Structure and Function Cannot Be Seperated.
— Junglelord

User avatar
Antone
Posts: 148
Joined: Fri Jun 27, 2008 5:28 pm
Contact:

Re: What is Real?

Post by Antone » Sat Nov 22, 2008 10:06 pm

altonhare wrote:And these are different ways of understanding because they have uniquely different and incompatible characteristics. For example, we know that these two perspectives are distinctly different because although the set {x:x is all the apples on my desk} may refer to [2 apples] at the moment, if I eat one of those apples, the set {x:x is all the apples on my desk} will now refer to only [1 apple]. By contrast, if I eat one of the {A1, A2} I have changed the set that I have. I now define reality by the set {A1}.
...this is fundamentally incorrect. When you eat the apple you no longer identify that particular arrangement of atoms/matter/whatever as an apple. A1 no longer exists, you have destroyed the relationship between the apple's constituents that you previously identified as "apple". You now identify those constituents as something else, like stomach sludge or something. All the apples on your desk (concept) now has one apple (object). Nothing is relative here. You define your objects (apples) and define your criteria for a relationship among those objects and refer to any set of objects that meets those criteria by a name such as "all the apples on my desk".
Once again, like a broken record, I acknowledge that the ideas I am expressing are not mainstream thinking on the topic. They are my own theory, which I have written up in detail. You're just seeing bits and snippets of it. That said, however, I think my version of reality is simpler and more intuitive, while simultaneously being more precise and capable of dealing with paradoxes and other logical problems. And these are the qualities by which we generally decide which theories are better than others. So, by these criterion, I believe my perspective IS fundamentally correct.

The fact that the [physical aspect of the eaten apple] changes, does not explain the fact that the [conceptual aspect of the set] does not change. The abstraction set that I used to define the reality of two apples sitting on my desk was:
(AD) {x:x is an apple sitting on my desk}

(AD) is NOT time dependent. Well, actually it is... It always refers to the [now]; to what is currently the case. If that were not the case, then (AD) would necessarily have to refer to every apple that has ever been on my desk, regardless of when it was there. That doesn't make any sense--and (AD) would still be a reference that changed every time I put a new apple on my desk. Because that new apple would necessarily have to be added to the [enumeration set].

No, (AD) must refer to the temporal [now]. And before I eat the apple the [now] reflects [2 apples] on my desk, while the [now after I eat the apple] reflects only [1 apple]. There is no way to get around this common sense fact. Nor is there any common sense way to understand our reference to the abstraction set at these two occasions as referring to two distinctly different sets--because the set is exactly the same on both occasions. it is:
(AD) {x:x is an apple sitting on my desk}

Now, we can create other types of abstraction sets that DO distinguish between these temporal references, for example:
(T1) {x:x is an apple sitting on my desk at time-1}

But that level of precision isn't necessary to adequately define the physical reality. And in fact (T1) is a less effect way to define the reality (is some ways), because [time-1] necessarily refers to an absolute moment in time. Which means that the instant before and after [time-1] would not be refered to by (T1). Thus, to reference the period of time that the apple was on my desk, I would need to list an infinite number of abstraction sets--one for each instant during which the apple was on my desk. Or I could simply say:
(T1-2) {x:x is an apple sitting on my desk from time-1 to time-2}

But still, we run into the problem of vague boudaries: do we start at the moment when the first apple atom contacts the desk, or do we start when all of the apple atoms that will come into contact have touched the desk. And since the apple atoms are constantly in motion, if we chose the later then it is a virtual impossibility, because the last atom might not come into contact until the apple is being taken off the desk. Thus, if we define that as our start time, it would appear that the apple was never really on the desk.

No, the best way to understand (AD) is to understand that it refers to the [perpetual now]; and it is a single, unchanging set. And as such, it necessarily has different qualities than the [enumeration sets] that are instances of (AD) at varous times--because these enumeration sets are time-dependent, and plural... while (AD) is independent of time and singular.
altonhare wrote:In other words, eating one of the apples did not change the name of one of the sets... but it did change the other set. Thus, they cannot be exactly the same set--because they do not have the same charateristics.
Your error in reasoning stems from your insistence that the two sets are distinct and separate, when they are inextricably linked. You cannot define the concept "all the apples on my desk" without first defining the object "apple". The first is not really a "set" so much as you are just pointing to two objects and calling them apples (essentially defining apple). If one gets eaten it doesn't change what an apple is! It changes the number of apples that meet the criteria defined by the concept "all the apples on my desk".
I agree and disagree.

My reasoning is without error. But you are right when you say that the two types of sets are inextricably linked. According to my DS theory, Both sets are part of a greater whole that I refer to as a class. Once again, a [set] is [that which contains elements], so we have two reciprocal aspects: [sets] and [elements]. If we think of the curley brackets, {}, as the set aspect, and what is between the curly brackets as the element aspect... then we can define the
[element aspect of the abstraction set] as the
[set aspect of the enumeration set], and vice versa.
The class is the combination of these two, which might be written as:
{A1, A2}{x: x is an apple on my desk}
The two types of sets are inextricably linked because they express two reciprocal perspectives--or ways of understanding the same class. (Again, I realize this isn't the way the term [class] is typically used).
altonhare wrote:There is another way that reality is relative. And that is in the sense that it is infinitely precise. We do not have the perceptual fauculties to perceive exactly what reality is... and if we did, we could not express that infinitely precise reality with absolute accuracy. So by necessity, the best we can do is approximate that absolute physical reality with a relative conceptual approximation.
Nature doesn't know what "precision" is. Nature is not "infinitely precise". Only humans think in terms of precision.
This is a very weak argument. Because if reality isn't precise then it isn't what it is--and it is necessarily vague. Neither of us believe that. And whether or not you want to call it by another term--I think we both know what I'm talking about. If you magnify a bug, you may well see a [hair-like thing] on it, but if you magnify down further that [hair] may begin to look more like a [tree], and if you keep zoming in on one of the [branches of the tree] that begins to show additional structure as well. The precise physical shape of reality is more exact than we have the ability to measure.

You can quibble over whether you want to refer to that as [precision] or not, but it doesn't change the logic of the argument.
But measurement has nothing to do with *explaining* Nature. We can explain nature without anything being "relative". Modern science is obsessed with mathematics i.e. measurement rather than physically explaining what happened. This is why the "relative" mindset has sunk in so strongly. People equate math, measurement, and observation with science.
I do not believe that measurements or numbers are the totality of how we "explain" nature. But I think it is a bit absurd to assume that numbers CANNOT be used as part of the total picture.

I agree with you that "explaining what happened" is often over looked. That's why I explain why things are the way they are using my reciprocal structure of reality. That way we don't have to just assume that something is physical because that's the way it is. And this chain of logic leads to a paradox--because that's the way it is. Instead, I provide explanations and a structure that I believe demonstrates how to easily avoid every paradox and problem in logic, set theory, mathematics, etc. .
Last edited by Antone on Sat Nov 22, 2008 10:35 pm, edited 3 times in total.

User avatar
Antone
Posts: 148
Joined: Fri Jun 27, 2008 5:28 pm
Contact:

Re: What is Real?

Post by Antone » Sat Nov 22, 2008 10:21 pm

junglelord wrote:Your right on Antone. I agree 100% with you.
Hi Junglelord,
Thanks for the input... It's nice (occasionally) to know that someone understands and agrees with what you're putting down. And sometimes I worry about the structural integrity of the walls behind my readers, what with everthing that appears to go sailing over their heads. lol

Locked

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 2 guests