klypp wrote:You also make your own definition of predictability. My dictionary says that to predict means "to state. tell about, or make known in advance, especially on the basis of special knowledge." But you are talking about "conscious perception/reaction". Well. I can see no foretelling in that...
Allow me to make it clearer.
When the bear smells (perception) the honey, then runs (reaction) to the bee hive, we say he "guessed" that, when he arrived at location Y, there would be honey there.
When a person hears a gun (perception) shot and ducks (reaction), we say they guessed/predicted/foretold that a bullet would intersect their head's location.
When you see (perception) the baseball bat in front of your face with Big Bubba behind it, then jump (reaction) back, we say they probably guessed/predicted/foretold that the baseball bat was going to intersect your head's location.
klypp wrote:
This is often called Laplace's demon. Not a bad name. Only a supernatural being would be able to know everything in the past and the future. And thus, altonhare, your "materialism" ends up with a god as good as any.
Some hypothetical omniscient being has to know what's going to happen a certain way in order for things to happen a certain way? You must be kidding.
Let's assume an omniscient but impotent being (all knowing but cannot influence the universe) exists.
Now let's assume he doesn't exist.
Are you really saying that, in the former case, state A is followed by state B but in the latter case its indeterminant?
I said before, determinant has nothing to do with predictable. Determinant simply means that identical situations give identical results. Whether you believe identical situations ever arise is another matter.
Even if identical situations never arise, there is still a single state/situation A that is followed by a single state/situation B, B is always caused by A, even if there is only one B ever. This implies that, if there is only one B ever there is only one A (one cause).
webolife,
If you disagree, then how do you engage in any meaningful scientific inquiry? If you try to explain phenomenon A as being a result of B, but phenomenon A also happens as a result of B,C, D, E, .... etc. how will you ever explain any phenomenon of Nature? How will you know when to stop looking for additional causes? Is 2 enough? 3, 4, 5...? How will you learn anything if, when you set up B, sometimes it gives A and sometimes not? If you agree that every state/situation is a direct result of its previous one and can be a result of no other, then what do you mean by "nondeterminant"? Do you simply mean "unpredictable"? In that case we're in agreement, I do not think a conscious entity will ever reduce Nature down to 100% predictability.
This is the standpoint of a scientist. If situation A did not yield B as it did the day before, it means the scientist made a mistake and this is not really situation A. A scientist may try to explain the new situation as caused by C. Although s/he knows that the universe cannot be 100% predictable, s/he can engage in meaningful inquiry.
klypp wrote:The only form of motion altonhare seems to be able to conceive is an object moving from A to B. It becomes apparent right from the beginning of his post.
It's the only form of motion anyone can conceive of, I'm just honest about it.
If you disagree then illustrate for me your alternative for "motion". Let's forgo wordy definitions that we'll just argue and debate over, just show me pictures. If you can't show me you're just bluffing.
klypp wrote:This is far more mechanistic than the gravity-based Big Bang. The universe is reduced to some kind of a 3D billiards game with a lot of bouncing balls. No room for EU there...
Wrong. EU is first and foremost about explaining natural phenomena. Currently the stance is that many phenomena are a result of (or have a component of) electrical and magnetic behavior. These behaviors can be explained "mechanicstically".
klypp wrote:"The blanket statement" is of course just an initial statement. Engels immediately fills this "blanket" with numerous examples. Not mentioned here by altonhare.
You should read the quotes you post of me. I summarized my objection to his subsequent examples, and made this clear:
altonhare wrote:In his ensuing argument he forgets about the immutability and fundamental necessity of a fundamental constituent...
Notice the keyword "ensuing", referring to what he says AFTER his blanket statement. You didn't comment on my argument at all.
klypp wrote:But now, we have altonhare's theory of identity.
This is called an "example". Not a "theory". I gave an example of the application of identity.
klypp wrote:Except maybe for the obvious flaw in his theory: Dorothy's body was dorothy's body and dorothy's head was dorothy's head even before she was beheaded.
Again you call an example a theory. There is no "theory of identity". If you say that something doesn't have a specific identity, what something are you talking about? Does it have identity? It doesn't? But what's "it"? What are you referring to? You have to use identity (specify something) to argue against it. It's not a theory.
Also, I never said Dorothy didn't have a head/body beforehand, so you're attacking a straw man.
Perhaps my example was unclear:
Dorothy=Dorothy
Dorothy'sbody=Dorothy'sbody
Dorothy'shead=Dorothy'shead
Dorothy's_decapitated_head=Dorothy's_decapitated_head
Dorothy's_headless_body=Dorothy's_headless_body
klypp wrote:Engels argues against "the old abstract standpoint of formal identity, that an organic being is to be treated as something simply identical with itself, as something constant". This is A=A. Engels want to replace this with an identity that includes change. And the changes he has in mind, is first and foremost internal changes. Relocation can sometimes be part of an identity, but normally it is not. Internal changes, however, is always present.
These changes are inherent to identity, but does not lead to an immediate change of identity. Given time, however, the identity will change. A simple example: The small, almost unobservable changes in an egg will finally lead to a chicken
If Engels is proposing that something's identity involves change, then he will have tell us
when something has identity. Is it in a year, or once X happens? Or is he talking about past changes? How many past changes does an entity need to have before it has identity? If Engels can tell us this, where does he get the numbers? Is the egg an egg because it was an egg the moment before, or because it will be a chicken next? Is every egg different that results in a different chicken? We have egg_that_will_result_in_chicken_A and egg_that_will_result_in_chicken_B, etc.? Or do we have egg_produced_by_chicken_A, egg_produced_by_chicken_B, etc.? But this is no better/different than what I argue!
Is Engels really proposing that something doesn't have identity until a particular change happens? Then what was it before the changed happened? An identity-less 'thing'? Does something have identity only because of the changes that WILL happen? Does it not have identity in the meanwhile?
klypp wrote:
Now, back to altonhare. He is actually arguing for a third theory: Change immediatelylead to new identity. In his desperate eager to save his mantra, he ends up disproving it!
OMG, he just won the million dollars!!!
Care to actually show how this "disproves" identity? Or would you rather just keep flingin' crap?